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The Role of Collateral in a Model
of Debt Renegotiation
HOW DOES THE PROSPECr OF FUTURE DEBT I'CnegOtiaáOn af-
fect the lender's security interests az the contracáng date? We study this question in a
simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric infotmation. A risk-
neutral entrepreneur needs to raise capital for a risky investment project. The project
outcome, howover, cannot direcdy be observed by the creditors. The optimal loan
arrangement is a debt contract with a bankruptcy clause that acts as a payment in-
cenáve for the entrepreneur. The insátuáon of bankruptcy allows the creditor to
take possession of some of the entrepteneur's assets in the event of default. We show
that the eztent of the entrepreneur's liabiliáes in the optimal loan contract depends
upon the creditor's commitment to impose bankruptcy should default ever occur. If
the cn:ditor is precommited not to forgive any pottion of the outstanding debt, a
limited liability arrangement is optimal. This means that default should enátle the
creditor to liquidate only the assets remaining form the project that has been 6-
nanced by the loan. In the absence ofprecommitment, however, such limitaáon of
liability may no longer be opámal. Instead, debt may efficiently be secured by addi-
áonal outside assets.
Although outside collateral increases the total amount of assets liquidated in the
event of bankruptcy, it may lower the expected dead-weight loss associated with
inefficient asset liquidaáon. We show that collateral requirements make it more like-
ly that the iniáal debt contract is tenegoáated and some part of the debt forgiven in
case the entnepreneur declares himself unable to pay his debt in full. 'Itlus, favoring
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debt renegotiation, collateral may help avoiding an inefficient change in project
ownership. Indeed, a recent study by Asquish, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1992)
shows that companies under financial distress frequently reswcture their debt
through direct negotiations. They find that that of seventy-six companies in their
sample, fifty-nine restructured their bank debt in some way. Moreover, the bank's
restructuring incentives are found to be positively related to the degree of
collateralization.
Renegotiation will occtu when the borrower-lender rolationship reaches a point
where the initial contract stipulates an ex post inefficient outcome. Usually the cred-
itor is less efficient as manager of the project's assets than is the borrower so that
bankruptcy may prove ez post inefficient. The contracting parties may achieve a
Pareto-improvement by writing a new contract under which the entrepreneur main-
tains project ownership at a reduced debt level. The possibiGry of renegotiation im-
plies that default will not always be penalized by bankruptcy and both parties to the
loan realize this. Knowing that there is a chancc of debt forgiveness, the borrower
may falsely claim that the debt exceeds the investment's retum and that he is forced
to default. This motive for cheating is weakened when collateral has been posted.
The higher the degree of collateralization, the more inclined is the creditor to be-
lieve that the project return actually is low when he observes default. Consequently
he finds the option of taking over the project less profitable in comparison to forgiv-
ing a portion of the debt. In this way, outside collateral may reduce the expected cost
of banlwptcy. Its benefit is positively related to the siu of the dead-weight loss
resulting from project liquidation. Especially high-risk firms will find it advan-
tageous to offer collateral to the'tr potential creditors.
A convincing explanation of the existence of secured debt must demonstrate that
its use may provide gains that exceed its costs. ~ If collaural merely redistributed
wealth between the borrower and lender in the event of default, other contractual
devices that avoid costly liquidation of collateralized assets would prove advan-
tageous. To compensate the lender for the risk of default, firms would be better off
by paying interest rates that reflect the'u risk category instead of selling secured
debt. The rticcnt literature on credit contracts with asymmetric information shows
that this azgument fails if the lender knows less than the borrower about the invest-
ment's riskiness. In credit markets with moral hazard or adverse selection outside
collateral may serve as an incentive or scrcening device (See Besanko and Thakor
1987; Bester 1985, 1987; and Chan and Kanatas 1985). Outside collateral increases
the punishment for default. If the borrower can choose among a variety of projects
with different riskiness, collateral enforces the selection of less-risky projects. Sim-
ilazly, as a response to adverse selection, lenders may offer a menu of contracts to
sort loan loan applicants into risk categories. Entrepreneurs with low probabiliry of
default then reveal themselves by accepting collateral requirements that would be
unattractive for high risks. In summary, this literature predicts a negative relation
between default risk and the amount of collateral. This prediction is opposite to the
1. Schwutz (1981) gives a critical miew of uptana[ions of the existence of axwed deM.
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convcntional wisdom that high-risk fitms have to issue security in order to attract
creditors.2
To focus on the impact of tenegotiation on the terms of the initial debt contract,
we consider a model wherc all parties have ez ante symmetric information. The in-
vestment's return distribution and the entrepreneur's ability to pay his debt are not
affected by the tetms of the loan agreement. In contrast to the incentive or screening
ezplanation, we find that collateral is more likely to be used for financing high-risk
investments. Indeed, we conclude that cenegotiation may seriously undemtine the
role ofcollatetal as a screening device. The reason is that low-risk entrepreneurs can
no longer distinguish themselves by posting collateral if collatecalization becomes
attractive also for high-risk entrepreneurs.
Our basic model is inspired by Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Diamond (1984),
who derive debt contracts as optimal arrangements under asymmetric infonnation
about project outcomes. Their analysis, however, presumes precommitment so that
contracts may include ex-post inefficiencies that are common knowledge. Huber-
man and Kahn (1988) study debt renegotiation in a model where borrower and
lender have symmetric information but return realizations are not verifiable. In this
context, there is no ex-post inefficient bankruptcy and the institution of limited lia-
bility suffices to encoutage the entrepreneur to pay his debt. Bergman and Callen
(1991) model debt renegotiation as a bazgaining game between debtholdcrs and
shareholdcrs. The shareholders may force concessions from the creditors by threat-
ening to run down the fitTtt's assets. The cteditors anticipation of the bargaining out-
come crcates an upper bound on the amount of debt in the financial structure of the
fittn. Hart and Moore (1989) show that debt tenegotiation may involve inetiicient
asset liquidation despite symmetric information. In their multipcriod model this
may happen because the entrepreneur cannot commit credibly to pay a certain
amount of money in the futute. Much of the literature on debt renegotiation deals
with the case óf sovereign debt (see, for example, Bulow and Rogoff 1989; Gale and
Hellwig 1989; and Fetnandez and Rothenthal 1988). The basic assumption of this
literatute is that thero is no third party enforcement of contracts. This restricts the
possibility of secured lending because in the event ofdefault the creditor has at most
limited access to the borrower's assets.
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Scction 1 presents an exten-
sive game of contract design and renegotiation. Section 2 studies the case of prc-
commitment as a point of refercnce. l)ptimal contracts in the absence of
preconunitment are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1. TF~ BASIC MODF-L,
Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who is endowed with a project. The project
requires some fixed initial investrnent I and yields the random rcturn X. W ith proba-
2. This view is empicically supported by Leetó and Scon's (l989) malysis of small lwsiness loans.
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bility 0 G p c 1 the project is successful and the rcturn realization is Xr; if the
project fails, the return is Xj, with X, ~ Xf 1 0.
The entreprcneur has no liquid funds to finance the investment. He raises the
amount I by issuing debt. As in Diamond ( 1984) or in Gale and Hellwig (1985), this
form of finance results from the assumption that borrower and lender have asymmet-
ric information. The entrepreneur observes the retum realization at no cost. The
crcditor receives this information only afur taking over the project. However, such
a transfer of ownetship is costly. The creditor's net valuation of the project netum X
is aX, with 0 G a L 1. The cost (1 - oc)aC arises because the original entrepreneur
has morc ability to complete the project or because monitoring and liquidating the
project is costly for the creditor. Also we will assume that outsiders remain unin-
fortned about the project outcome even when the creditor becomes owner of the
project. Since rctutn realizations are not verifiable to outsiders, the borrower's re-
payment obligation R cannot be conditioned on the project outcome. Notice that the
entreprcneur's private information about the investment retutn is the only source of
infotmational asymmetries in the model; there is no uncertainty about the riskiness
of the project or the valuations of assets. l.et
a[pX, t (1 - p),Yfl ~ 1. (1)
Thus the expected forcclosurc valuc of the project exceeds the investment cost and
the creditor's expected profit from making a loan can be made positive simply by
allowing him to foreclose ori the project in the event of default.
While the entrcprcneur has no liquid funds, he owns some amount W of collat-
eralizable wealth. This wealth cannot be used to finance investment directly, say,
because it consists of illiquid assets, or it rcprcsents the entrepreneur's future in-
come outside the project. However, the creditor may use W, or any fraction thereof,
as collateral C for a loan. The lender's and the borrower's valuation of C arc not the
same. Taking possession of and liquidating C typically involves transaction costs.
These costs will be represented by a factor I-~, with 0 c~ e 1, so that the
creditor's net valuation of C equals ~C. Through collateralization the creditor can
receive additional assets outside the project which otherwise would not be legally
attachable. A main focus of our analysis is to investigate why it might be optimal to
assign such a right to the creditor in the event of default.3
Suppose the creditor breaks even only if the loan contract specifies a rcpayment
obligation R that excecds Xf. Since the entreprcneur has private information about
the project outcome, he must have some contractual incentives to pay R when the
rcturn is X,. Tilis inccntive can bc created by giving the creditor the right to seiu
some of the debtor's assets in the event of default. Some models of the credit market
assume that the borrower rcpays his loan only if the value of the collateral exceeds
his debt (see, for ezample, Barm 1976 and Benjamin 1978). Undeethis arrangement
3. In principlc, a contract could transftt r,ome of the entn:peneur'a illiquid assets independently of
whethen c~ fulfills his n:paymrnt obliguion or not. It is easy to see, however, that such an unogernmt
wwld be sutaptimal if ~ ~ 1.
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the creditor is allowed to liquidate the collateral C but not the project assets. In the
event of project failure, the entrepreneur pays Xf and loses C s W. As long as the
incentive restriction R s C t XJ is satisfied, the successful entrepreneur is better off
by paying R than by defaulting. Of course, this solution works only if W is suffi-
cieptly large. We are interested in the case where collateralization is insufficient to
provide appropriate payment incentives. The creditor's right to foreclose on the pro-
ject assets becomes then essential to induce the botrower to pay his debt. This will
create a role for renegotiation because liquidating the project is ex post inefficient.
Accordingly, we will assume
I~WtX~. (2)
Thus the creditor cannot recover the amount! in case of project failure even when he
takes over all of the entrepreneur's assets. Therefore, the debt contract must specify
a repayment obligation R? I 1 W t Xf Collateralization cannot be used as a pay-
ment incentive as the successful entrepreneur would rather pay X~ and give up his
wealth W than pay R.
In summary, a debt contract C-(R, C) obliges the entrepreneur to pay the
amount R; failure to fulfill this obligation entítles the creditor to take over the project
and the collateral C s W. The contract femploys the threat of bankruptcy to induce
the successful entrepreneur to pay R even though the creditor is unable to observe
the project retum. This threat, however, may commit the parties to an inefitcient
outcome. !n the case of project failure it implies the dead-weight cost ( I- a)aCj f
(1 -(i)C. Therefore the creditor may wish to renegotiate the original contract I' and
to forgive some part of the debt after the entrepreneur announces project failure. If
actually the project has failed, he would maximiu his payoff by making the take-
it-or-leave-it offer 0 - (XJ,C) which reduces the firm's debt to Xf and makes the
creditor owner of the collatetalized assets C. Accepting this proposal leaves the
entrepreneur no worse off because the original contract allows the creditor to take
possession of the project and the collatetal C. While contract tenegotiation of this
kind may avoid an inefficient allocation of project ownership, it has a negative im-
pact on the successful entrepreneur's incentives to pay his debt. If he pretends pro-
ject failure and the creditor concedes to renegotiate, he gains R - Xf - C.
To analyu botrower and lender behavior in such a situation we will adopt the
following styliud game of contract design and renegotiation. Potential creditors
compete by offering conttacts of the fotm I' - (R, C). For completeness, each credi-
tor also has the option of not making an offer, which ensures him a profit of uro. !f
the firm finds none of the contracts acceptable, the game ends and all partíes get
uro payoff. Otherwise the entrepreneur undettakes the investment by accepting the
offer of one of the creditors. All other would-be creditors receive a payoff of zero.
As a trsult of competition, the equilibrium contract maximius the entrepreneur's
expected payoff subject to the condition that the creditor eams zero expected profits.
Of course, these payoffs depend on the botrower's and lender's behavior after the
contract has been signed. Figure 1 describes their moves in the remaining game,
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-C,ax,~OC-1
X,-Xr-C.Xr~OC-~
.aXr ~ OC -~
1.0` -C.Xr~OC-~
Fle. 1. The Reoegaiuion Game
where we allow the players to adopt mixed strategies. The significance and inter-
pretation of such strategies will be discussed in combination with the equilibrium in
section 3.
~ In stage one of the borrower-lender relationship X, is realized with probability p
and Xf is realized with probability I- p. This is observed by the entrcpreneur
while the creditor remains uninformed.
~ In stage two only the successful entrepreneur can pay R as Xf c R s X,. Thus
after observing Xf, the entreprcneur is forced to default. In the event of success
he has two choices: He can make his debt payment or he can claim project fail-
ure and default. He chooses a possibly mixed strategy so that he defaults with
probability 0 5 d s 1 and pays R with probability 1- d. In the event of rcpay-
ment the game ends with payoffs X, - R andR- I for the entrepreneur and the
creditor, respectively.
~ In stage three, upon default the creditor either imposes bankruptcy or offers the
new contract t1 -(X~. C). Again we allow for random strategies and 0 5 b ~ 1
denotes the pmbability of bankruptcy. In the case of bankruptcy the creditor
takes over the project so that his payoff is either aX, f QC - ~ or aXf f aC - l,
depending upon the entrepreneur's type. The entrepreneur's payoff equals -C.
By contract renegotiation the ctrditor ensures himself a payoff of Xf f(3C - l;
the entrepreneur's payoff from 0 depends upon his type and is either X, - Xl
- C or -C.
We assume that bankruptcy entitles the lender to liquidate the entire project.
Thereforc, by imposing bankruptcy on a lying entrcpreneur the lender may get a
payoff that exceeds R- l. It is easy to see that this assumption is consistent with an
optimal loan arrangement. If the creditor could appropriate only some part of the
project, then cheating would become morc attractive for the successful entrepreneur
and ezpected bankruptcy costs would be increased. Our stylized model gives the
creditor two options in the event of default: He can either exercise his right to forc-
close on the debtor's assets or forgive a portion of the debt. Of course, the renego-
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tiation procedure could be modeled by a more complicated bargaining game with
additional stages. For instance, one might allow the creditor to delay the bankruptcy
decision in stage thrce to give the enttspteneur thc chance to pay his debt in stage
four. If he fails to do so, then in stage five the creditor faces the same decision prob-
lem as in stage three before. The outcome of this extended game will be identical to
our three-stage versíon. In general, we are confident that our results continue to hold
in a number of variations of the basic theme.
An interesting point is that even the renegotiated contract ~ involves costly liq-
uidation of the entrepreneur's outside assets as long as the original contract I' entails
collatetal tequirements. The reason is that after project failure the debtor óas no
Gquid funds in excess of X~ to compensate the creditor for a reduction in C. A
Pareto-improving move that avoids the cost (1 -~)C is not feasible. The debtor's
liquidity constraint may thus trsult in an inefficient liquidation of assets. This phe-
nomenon appears to be a typical characteristic of debt renegotiation and has been
observed in a different context by Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Mooro
(1989).
2. OP['AtAL CONTRAC['S WCCHO(7C RENEGOTiATION
First, we want to take a look at the contracting problem in the absence of debt
renegotiation. We thus study the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game described
in the fotsgoing section under the exogenous restriction b~ 1. This serves to illus-
ttate the rolation between renegotiation and collateralization. It should not suggest
that the creditors would prefer to commit themselves not to renegotiate if they had
the means for such a commitment. The question of whether ex ante commitment of
this kind is actually desirable will be addressed in section 3.
Note that our description of debt contracts precludes the use of random devices.
The creditor's right in the event ofdefault is detenninistic; he cannot impose bank-
tuptcy with some conttactually specified probability. As noted by Townsend (1979)
and Mookheqee and Png (1989), stochastic auditing may be preferable in situations
with costly monitoring of income realizations so that the assumption of detenninis-
tic contracts may be restrictive. Loan contracts specifying a random allocation of
ownership rights, howevet, are hardly observed in reality. As a theoretical justifica-
tion we assutne that random devices are not verifiable so that stochastic outcomes
are not contractible. It is important to bear in mind that as a result of this assumption
the initial contract is incomplete.
When the creditor always uses his right to foteclose on the debtor's assets in the
event of default, the successful entrepreneur is better off by paying his debt as long
as R c X,. Commitment not to forgive any pazt of the debt constitutes a strong en-
forcement mechanism that induces the entrepreneur to reveal his type tntthfully. As
in Gale and Hellwig (1985), the thmat of banlavptcy serves to satisfy incentive-
compatibility conditions that make sure that the entrepreneur tells the truth for each
return realizaáon. Enforcing ttvth-telling behavior, however, has its cost. With
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probability 1- p, project ownership does not rest with the entrcpreneur. The fol-
lowing result deals with the optimality of collateralization in this situation.
PROaostnoN 1: Assume that creditors ore commitred nor to forgive any debr so
thar b E 1. Then in equilibrium a loan contract I'' is signed which satisfits C' - 0.
PROOF: As a result of competition, I'' maximizes the entneptsneur's ezpected
payoff subject to the lenders' break-even constraint. Define R' by
pR' t (1 - pkcXf - ! . (3)
Then ( 1) implies R' G X, so that the successful entrepreneur with contract I'' ~
(R', 0) optimally chooses d' - 0 in stage two. Consequently the lender's ezpected
payoff from proposing I'' is zero and the entrepreneur's ezpected payoff is
P(X, - R') - PX, t (1 - p)aX~ - I 10 . (4)
Now consider any other contract T which gives positive ezpected payoffs to the
firm. Then R c X, again implies d- 0 so that the lender brcaks even if
pR t(1 - p)(ocXf t ~C) - I. (5)
Given ( 5), thc entrepreneur's profit from I' equals
p(X,-R)-(1-p)C-PX,t(1 -p)(o:X~-(1-S)C)-I
G p(X, - R') . (6)
This proves that any contract I' with C~ 0 is suboptimal and that in equilibrium the
project is financed by I''.Q.E.D.
Collateral cannot improve efficiency if bankruptcy occurs solely as a result of
project failure. In this case it only increases the dead-weight cost of the change in
firm ownership. For collateral to become effective, it must have an impact upon the
equilibrium probability of banlwptcy. As we shall see, this may happen when debt
renegotiation is possible.
3. RENEG077ATION AND THE OPTIMAI.I7Y OF COII.ATERAL
In the absence of precommitment the appropriate solution concept for the con-
tracting game is the perfect Bayesian equilibriu.m. This basically means that each
agent's behavior has to be optimal givcn the other party's behavior in every stage of
the game. Morcover, in the final game stage the creditor's beliefs about the actual
project outcome have to be consistent with updating of prior probabilities according
to Bayes' rule. When default occurs, the croditor temains uninfottned about the pro-
ject outcome. From Bayes' rule the posterior probability that X, has been realized is
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a(d) - pd~(pd t l - p) , (7)
because the successful enttepreneur defaults with probability d. The probability d is
determined endogenously by optimizing behavior on the part of the successful entre-
preneur. In equilibrium the creditor forms raàonal expectations so that after observ-
ing default he concludes that the project return is X, with probability ~r(d) and X~
with probability 1 - ~r(d).
As a first step toward investigating the features of equilibrium conttacts we con-
sider the subgame following the realization of X. Suppose a loan has been made. In
addiàon, let Xf t W G R e X,. The motivation for the first inequality is that a
contract with R s Xf f W would not allow the lender to betak even because of (2).
Clearly the precommitment solution studied in the foregoing section is inconsistent
with sequential rationality. As the entreprenetu reacts to ó- 1 by setting d- 0,
Bayesian updating requitrs the creditor to conclude that the project has failed when
he obscrves default. Given this information, however, imposing bankruptcy is sub-
optimal because the payoff from renegotiating C is higher by the amount (1 - a)X~.e
17te cquilibrittm concept precludes the use of incredible threats to enforce repay-
ment. The equilibrium then prescribes the parties to adopt random strategies in
stages two and three. Indeed, we already have seen that b- 1 can no longer be part
of an equilibrium path. The following argument reveals that b- 0 cannot represent
equilibrium behavior either. Expecting that the creditor always concedes to ~ in the
final stage, the successful entrepreneur would optimally default as X, - R G X, - Xf
- C and so d- 1. But given the posterior probability ar(d) -~rr(1) - p, the creditor
prefers liquidation of the project to the reduced debt payment Xf because a[pX, t
(1 - p)JC~J ~ X~ by (1) and (2). This means the creditor optimally chooses b- 1,
which contradicts the entrepreneur's expectation that b- 0. This leaves 0 G b c 1
as the remaining candidate for equilibrium. Accordingly, the creditor must be indif-
ferent about imposing bankruptcy or proposing 0. This is the case if
a[Tr(d)J1C, t (1 - ar(d)yY~ - XJ. (8)
In equilibrium the borrower forms rational expectations about the lender's behavior.
Therefore, the successful entrepreneur's expected payoff from defaulting is
(1 - b)(X, - Xj) - C. He loses the collateral C but with probability (1 - b) he
maintains ownership of the firm by paying the rcduced debt Xp It follows from (8)
that 0 c d c 1 and so also the borrower randomizes after observing X- X,. For him
to be indifferent between default and repayment, it must be the case that
X,-R-(1 -b)(X,-Xf)-C. (9)
4. Qeuly thia is no longer the cue when [he botrower pays the lowtt ptoceeds. Xr as aooo u he
dxlares fe,ilurc. If the game is modified in this way. one hu to introdua some áxed cost K to cnsute that
project liquidation is costly. By imposing bankruptcy the crcditor then geu a(X, - X~) - K if X a X~ and
-K if X ~ Xr Equuion (8) then becomes air(d)(X, - X~) - K and the equilibrium analysis follows the
same uguments.
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Solving equations ( 8) and ( 9) for d and b, we obtain the following rcsult:
PttorostrtoN 2: Assume that the project has been financed by a loan rwirh Xt t
W G R G X~. Then the equilibrium in the following subgame is unique and is given
by
d~ -(1 - p)(1 - a)Xf bR -.R - Xf - C
p(aXs - Xf) Xf - Xf
The mixed strategies described in Proposition 2 may be viewed as the beliefs of
the two players concerning their opponents behavior (see Aumann 1987). The crcdi-
tor believes that the successful entrepreneur rcpudiates wíth probability d' and the
entreprcneur expects ihat bankruptcy will be imposed with probability 6'. In equi-
librium all decisions to which a strictly positive probability is assigned arc optimal,
given the beliefs. An altemative interprctation is due to Harsanyi (1973), who dem-
onstrated that mixed strategy equilibria may be viewed as the limit of pure strategy
equilibria of a rolated "disturbed" game as the disturbances vanish. In the disturbed
game each party's payoff is subject to a small random disturbance, the value of
which is known only to him. Due to these exogenous random shocks, the individu-
al's behavior appears to be random even though it is actually detetministic.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that, in contrast withthe casc of prc-
commitment, the firm's repayment behavior no longer reveals its private informa-
tion about the project outcome. As 0 e d' G 1, therc is partial pooling so that the
creditor is not precisely infortned about the true rcturn realization when he observes
default. This is similar to observations by Dewatripont (1989), Hart and Tirole
(1988), and Laffont and Tirole (1988), who conclude that the possibility of rcnego-
tiation favors the use of mixcd strategies and reduces the degree of ínformation
revelation.
Proposition 2 indicatcs why in the absence of prccommitment it may be desirable
to include collateral requirements in the loan contract. Increasing C has a dual impact
on the project's overall profitability. On one hand it creates an additional dead-
weight loss because the entrepreneur's valuation of C exceeds the lender's valua-
tion. On the othcr hand, b' and thereby the probability of an inefficient change in
project ownership is lowered. Which of these effects dominates the other depends
upon the relative costs expressed by the factors a and ~. Define
~ ~ [ap(X, - Xf) - (1 - a)Xf1 i[aP(X~ - Xf)) . (10)
Note that 0 G~ G 1. Morcover, ~ and a are positively related and ~ tends to unity
when a approaches one.
Pttot~ostnoN 3: If [i ~~then in equilibrium a debt contract I'' is signed such rhar
Cs - W. Otherwise ir is optimal to set C' - 0.
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PxooF: By (1) and ( 2), no creditor will offer a contract with R s Xf f W. When a
conttact I' with R ~ X~ t W is signed, Proposition 2 applies and so the creditor
teceives the payment R with probability p(1 - d'). When default occurs he is indif-
ferent between bankruptcy and renegotiation. Therefore, with probability pd' t
1- p the creditor receives the payoff X~ t ~C - l. Accordingly, for I' to be individ-
ually rational for the creditor, it has to be the case that
p(1 - d')R t(pd~ t 1 - p)(Xj t aC) z 1-
The entrepreneur's payoff is -C when the project fails; otherwise he is indifferent
between defaulting and paying R. Therefore, his expected payoff from signing C is
given as p(Xs - R) -(1 - pK. As a result of creditor competition, the constraint
(11) must be binding in equilibrium so that substituting R from (l l) yields
P(X, - R) - (1 - P)C -
pX~{.pd'tlkpX,-(Pd'fl-p)(1-~)-d' 1
1-d 1-d' C-I-dw. (12)
Thus maximizing the entrepreneur's payoff with respect to C subject to 0 5 C s W
implies C' - W if ( pd~ f l - p)(1 -~) G d'. Using the value of drt from Proposi-
tion 2, this condition is easily seen to be equivalent to R 1~ Of course, C' - 0
solves the maximization problem if ~ s~ Q.E.D.
Whether posting collateral is optimal depends upon the size of the entrepreneur's
comparative advantage to own and manage the fitm. For a given value of the param-
eter (3, the gains from collateralization are higher the lower the value of a. This
means collateral becomes useful when the costs of liquidating the firm aze suffi-
ciently high. When project ownership is itrelevant as a gces to one, collateral re-
quirements turn out to be suboptimal.
The relation between project risk and the equilibrium contract provides another
interesring ínsight. To investigate this relationship, we deóne the parameter
~ ~ (1 - a)Xj1I(1 - ~)a(X, - XI)l . (13)
Inspection of (10) and ( 13) shows that ~ 1 aif and only ifp G fi.s This leads to a
simple Corollary of Proposition 3:
PttOPOSmoN 4: !f p G Q, then in equi[ibrium a debt eontract I'' is signed sueh
tkat C' - W. Otherwise it is optimal to set C' - 0.
The result has the following intuition. The prospect of debt rcnegotiation no long-
er induces truth-telling behavior on the part of the entrepreneur. !n this situation the
intention of collateral agteements is not to punish for pmject failure but to make
3. Nae ttut p e 6 is consisten[ with assumption ( I) unless (1 -~~l ~(1 -(ia)Xr Tf~ 7 I, Proposi-
tion 4 símply says that sening C~ W is always opnmat.
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default less attractive in the event of success. As Proposition 2 shows, the equilibri-
um likelihood of dishonesty d' is inversely related to the project's success proba-
biliry p. Thercforc a higher success rate makes it more likely that the entreprcneur
will losc his outside assets because of project failurc rather than because of the at-
tempt to cheat. As a consequence, collateral is morc effectivo with a high risk of
project failure.
Interestingly, the conclusion of Proposition 4 is in direct contrast with the signal-
ing theory of collateral, as developed in Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bester (1985,
1987), and Chan and Kanatas (1985). These models predict a positive rclation be-
tween the investment's success probability and the degree oi collauralization. The
underlying assumption is that the creditors are less informed about project risks than
the entrcprcneur. Differcnt contracts are then used to sort loan applicants into risk
classes. Entrcprcneurs who are morc likely to succeed arc inclined to post a higher
amount of collateral because they arc less likely to lose it in the event of project
failure. In equilibrium low-risk cntreprcneurs choose debt contracts with low rcpay-
ment obligations and high collateral requirements whercas high-risk entroprcneurs
sign contracts with high rcpayment obligations and low collateral requircments.
Finally we turn to the question of whether precommitment not to renegotiate the
original contract I'' increases social wclfarc. One way of prcventing debt renegotia-
tion is to employ the aid of third parties, as suggested by Schelling (1960): The
creditor signs a contract with an outsider agrceing to pay a larg~ sum of money
should he ever forgive any portion of the debt. Of course, for such a scheme to
work, the outsider must be incorruptible because otherwise he could be bribed into
permitting rcnegotiation if the debt contract prcscribes an ez post inefficient liquida-
tion of assets. Alternatively, precotnmitment may be enforcod by rcputation consid-
erations. The concern for long-run reputation effects may induce the creditor not to
forgive the debt if this is optimal ez ante, even though it may be suboptimal ez post.
In what follows, we do not want to investigau the feasibility but rather tho desir-
ability ofprccommitment. ln other words, we comparc the dead-weight loss associ-
ated with bankruptcy in the two categories of equilibrium analyzed in the forcgoing
and the present section, respectively.
The possibility of renegotiation affects the ezpected cost of bankruptcy in two
ways. First, default is less frequently followed by project liquidation as b' e 1.
This positive effect is even enlazged when setting C' - W is optimal. Second, de-
fault occurs morc often because the entrepreneur may seek to cheat. Indeed, in the
equilibrium described by Proposition 2 the probability of default is pd' t 1 - p
comparcd with 1 - p if b E l. This effect is especially harmful because in some
cases the succcssful project is liquidated. Note that competition reduces the credi-
tor's expected profits to uro in any equilibrium. Thercfore, the entrcprcneur's ex-
pected payoff is critical for evaluating the welfare implications of prccommitment.
~ttorostTtoN 5: The entrepreneur's txpecred payoff is higher in the equilibrium
where renegotiation is possible than in the equilibrium with prccommitment not to
rcnegotiate.
u: Morrev, cxmrr, nNn e~rncu.,c
PttooF: The entrepreneur's equilibrium payoff in the two categories of equilibri-
um is given by (4) and (12), respectively. Suppose, contrary to the Proposition, that
the expression in (12) does not exceed the exprcssion in (4). Because C is chosen to
maximiu (12), this implies
(Pd' t 1- p~ICj - I 5 (1 - d'X(1 - pkiXj - n. (14)
Using (7) and ( 8), it follows that (14) is equivalent to
a(Pd'X, f (1 - pyY~ 5(1 -d')(1 - p~Xf- d"1 . (15)
But (15) implies a(pX, t(1 - p)X~) 5 I, a contradiction to assumpáon (1). This
proves that the Proposition must hold. Q.E.D.
It is important for this result that the initial contract is incomplete in that it does
not allow for randomization. If stochastic debt forgiveness werc contractible, the
"renegotiation-proofness" principle would apply that implies that the absence of
commitment lowers welfare. Proposition 5 is an example demonstrating that this
principle may fail to hold when contracts are incomplete. As a result, we may ex-
pect to observe debt renegotiation in practice even when the creditors have the
means to commit themselves not to forgive any debt. Competition among tenders
does not favor eliminating the prospect of renegotiation. Yet, one should regard this
implication of our model with caution. In particular the assumption that the contrac-
ting parties have symmetric informadon about the project's return characteristics
seems important: When the entrepreneur knows more about the project's ex ante
profitability than the creditor, renegotiation may in fact be harmful. Adverse selec-
tion may occur when the creditor cannot commit to liquidating inefficient firms in
the future. Dewatripont and Maskin (1989) discuss this aspcct in a mode! wherc the
creditors would lilce to commit ex ante against refinancing in order to deter entrcpre-
neurs from starting bad projects.
Our discussion of the conflict between Proposition 4 and the signaling motive for
collateral indicates another reason why renegotiation may lead to adverse selection.
In the absence of renegotiation entrepreneurs with good projects can distinguish
táemselves from those with bad projects by posting more collateral. But, Proposi-
tion 4 shows that also the high-risk entrepreneurs will find it advantageous to offer
collateral when there is a chance of renegotiation. Zhis means that renegotiation
may preclude a separating equilibrium where collateral serves as a screening device.
Good .and bad projects wi11 then be pooled and, as shown by De Meza and Webb
(1987), the equilibrium will have a tendency toward a higher level of aggregate in-
vestment than is socially optimal.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates how the prospect of fumre debt renegotiation affects the
lender's security intecssts at the contrdcting date. The terms of the initial debt con-
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tract play a strategic role in the development of the borrower-lender relationship;
indirectly they determine the likelihood of renegotiation and the terms of the renego-
tiated contract. Renegotiation occurs because the absence of precommitment pre-
cludes incredible battktuptcy threats. As a result, there is a chance that the creditor
responds to default by forgiving some part of the debt rather than by imposing bank-
ruptcy. This in turn influences the borrower's default dccision. In otu model the
creditor cannot distinguish whether the borrower defaulu voluntarily or whether he
is actually unable to meet his payment obligations. The chance of debt forgiveness
may induce the borrower to falsely report that the investment's retum is too low to
pay the full amount of debt.
We show that these circumstances favor the issuance of debt that is secured by
outside assets. The event of default entitles the creditor to liquidate the borrower's
collateralized wealth in addition to the assets remaining from the investment pro-
ject. Although outside collateral inctrases the total amount of assets liquidated in
the case of bankruptcy, perhaps surprisingly it may actually lower the expected
dead-weight loss associated with asset liquidation. The reason is that collateraliza-
tion reduces the debtor's motives for voluntary default so that bankruptcy is less
likely to occur. We show that this effect is especially relevant for high-risk invest-
ment projects. Therefore, such firms are more likcly to be financed through loans
that include collateral requirements than low-risk 6tms.
While debt renegotiation may simply be interpreted as resulting from the credi-
tor's inability to precommit himself, we find that renegotiation may in fact increase
welfare. This provides an efficiency explanation of why debt renegotiation is fre-
qucntly observed in practice. We are careful, however, to point out that our assump-
tion of ex ante symmetric information is essential for this result.
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